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Chapter pages in book: (p. 10 - 21)periods: In 1940—1941 American troops were not fighting overseas
and the characteristics of a wartime economy were not fresh in the
minds of Americans. During the Korean period the United States
was actively engaged in the hostilities and there was a grave pos-
sibility that the conflict would acquire global proportions. The
sense of the imminence of wartime economy at the outbreak of the
hostilities in Korea, combined with memories of the shortages of
consumer goods during World War II, created a climate of expec-
tations that had no counterpart in 1940—1941. The economic
effects of the mobilization that began in 1950 would have been
very different were it not for the fact that it was accompanied by
the hostilities in Korea and the attendant threat of global conflict.
It is apparent that a defense mobilization will provide a stimulus
to economic expansion if government expenditures increase the
aggregate demand for goods and services. However, the expansion
need not await the actual growth of government expenditures. In
the first place, some government expenditures for defense will lag
behind the placement of orders. For a time, the increased produc-
tion consequent on the orders will be reflected in private inven-
tory investment rather than in government expenditures. Second,
private fixed investment may be encouraged in industries related
to defense not only by the general stimulus of orders for goods but
also by such devices as accelerated tax amortization, direct loans,
and loan guarantees. Such private investment expenditures, while
resulting directly from the defense program, are not included in
government expenditures. Finally, the outbreak of hostilities or
the announcement of a mobilization program may stimulate ex-
pansion by affecting the expectations of various groups in the
economy. This last was a highly important influence in the nine
months following the invasion of South Korea in June 1950.
TheFirst Nine Months: Expansion and Inflation
Oneimmediate aftermath of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea
was a sharp increase in consumer expenditures. In the third quar-
ter of 1950 the spurt in expenditures for consumer durable goods
was especially pronounced, but there was also a noticeable rise
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inexpenditures for nondurables (Chart 5). Businessmen were not
prepared for the spurt in activity, and inventory investment, which
had been increasing in the first half of the year, decreased in the
third quarter (Chart 6). These developments may be followed .in
greater detail with the aid of the monthly series recorded in
Chart 7.
1112
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1949 1950 1951 1952Retail sales increased 9 per cent in July. Although retailers in-
creased their own purchases immediately—wholesale sales rose 10
per cent in July—their stocks were nonetheless reduced by the sud-
den spurt in sales.1 Wholesalers also reacted swiftly.Manufac-
turers' new orders jumped 16 per cent in July, and their sales
increased 4 per cent. There was no reduction in wholesale stocks,
but manufacturers' stocks of finished goods were diminished
(Chart 8). However, the decrease in manufacturers' stocks of fin-
ished goods was offset by an increase in stocks of purchased ma-
terials and goods in process. In short, buying was extremely active
on all market levels in the first few weeks of the war.
The July level of retail sales was maintained through August.
Meanwhile, the sales of wholesalers and manufacturers continued
to increase, and as a consequence retail and wholesale stocks were
enlarged. Then in September retail sales broke sharply down-
ward and continued to decline through November. The fourth
quarter decline in consumer expenditures affected durables and
nondurables alike.
Wholesale sales followed retail sales downward in September,
October, and November, but deliveries of goods to wholesalers and
retailers did not fall proportionately, and distributors' stocks rose
sharply. Manufacturers' stocks also increased, but primarily be-
cause of a rise in stocks of purchased materials and goods in process.
Thus manufacturers and distributors alike were making large addi-
tions to inventories in the fourth quarter of 1950 despite, or
cause of, the lull in consumer spending. The increase in nonfarm
inventories was more than twice as large as the decrease in con-
sumer expenditures in the last quarter of the year.2 The ratio of
inventory to •sales on all market levels increased substantially be-
tween June and December (Chart 9). The increase in stocks rela-
1The10 per cent increase in wholesale sales is evidence of an increase in purchases by
retailers, but it probably understates the magnitude of that increase, since retailers do
not buy all their goods from wholesalers. Similarly, manufacturers sell to one another
and to retailers, as well as to wholesalers, and manufacturers' sales are not equivalent
to wholesalers' purchases.
2Nonfarminventories were accumulated at an annual rate of $4.5 billion in the third
quarter of 1950 and $13.7 billion in the fourth quarter. The corresponding figures for
personal consumption expenditures were $203.8 billion and $199.6 billion. All figures
are seasonally adjusted (Survey of Current Business, July 1953, Table 43).
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tiveto sales was particularly pronounced at the retail level. There
is no evidence here of a physical shorta.ge of consumer goods at the
end of 1950.
Nonetheless, another consumer buying wave occurred in early
1951, following the reversals in the Korean campaign in late 1950.
Once again expenditures for consumer durables increased, al-
though not to the level of the third quarter of 1950. Expenditures
for nondurables were larger than in the first buying wave, however.
The big spurt in retail sales came in January, but distributors were
15CHART 9
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prepared and the goods were available.Sales by manufacturers
and wholesalers increased along with retail sales, and stocks rose
all along the line from manufacturer to retailer.Sales at retail
and wholesale fell off once more in February and March, but man-
ufacturers' sales were maintained, and distributors' stocks mounted
spectacularly. Nonfarm inventories were accumulated at an an-
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1951 1952There is ample evidence that the consumer buying waves in the
summer of 1950 and the winter of 1951 were not induced by rising
incomes. Retail sales rose 9 per cent in July 1950, personal income
only 2 per cent (Chart 7). By August, personal income had in-
creased 4 per cent above the June level, but retail sales were still
9 per cent above the June level. Again, in the second buying wave
of early 1951, the increase in retail sales was substantially greater
than the increase in income. Thus during both buying waves, the
increase in consumption was much larger than the increase in
disposable personal income.3 The seasonally adjusted annual rate
of personal saving declined 60 per cent in the third quarter of
1950, while disposable personal income increased nearly 4 per cent.
A similar sharp reduction in personal saving in the face of rising
income occurred in the first quarter of 1951 (Chart 10).
The timing and character of the buying waves make it apparent
that consumers were acting on expectations of shortages. The first
spurt in retail sales lasted two months, and occurred immediately
after the onset of hostilities. Sales then declined for several months
as the United Nations forces advanced northward in Korea, only
to spurt once again after the Chinese Communists entered the war
and the retreat from the Yalu began.4 Purchases of consumer dura-
ble goods fluctuated violently during this period (Chart 5).6 These
3 Disposable personal income increased by $8.0 billion (annual rate) in the third
quarter of 1950, but consumer expenditures rose by $14.1 billion. The corresponding
figures for the first quarter of 1951 are $2.3 billion and $10.6 billion. The data are
seasonally adjusted (Survey of Current Business, July 1953, Table 45).
4Intechnical terms, the function relating disposable personal income and consumer
expenditures shifted upward in the third quarter of 1950, downward in the fourth
quarter, and upward again in the first quarter of 1951, as expectations changed. It is
still an open question whether in nonnal circumstances consumer expectations vary
enough to affect the short-run consumption function. It is quite possible tha.t changes
in the expectations of individual consumers are ordinarily offsetting, and therefore
cancel out. During the period under discussion, however, memories of wartime short-
ages were still fresh, there was talk of rationing (which was authorized in the Defense
Production Act of 1950, approved September 8), and there were dramatic reversals in
the military situation, so that changes in expectations were general and in the same
direction.
5 Consumer credit controls were instituted on September 18 and strengthened on
October 16. The controls may have contributed to the relaxation of retail demand in
September, October, and November, but it is impossible to estimate the quantitative
importance of this factor. As is pointed out in the text, sales of nondurables also
(Continued on page 18)
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were the goods which had been in shortest supply during World
War II. Expenditures on nondurables—which include semidura-
ble as well as perishable commodities—were also noticeably affected
by consumer expectations. Expenditures on services, which cannot
be stockpiled, merely rose smoothly along with income (Chart 5).
declined in the fourth quarter, a development which can scarcely be attributed to
credit controls. More basic influences were doubtless at work. A lull was oniy to be
expected following the active forward buying of the summer months, particularly in
view of the favorable military developments which followed the landing at Inchon
(September 15) and which seemed to promise an early end to hostilities.
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1949 1950 1951 1952The commodities whose sales were most affected by forward buy-
ing may be seen in Table 1, which shows the sales of various classes
of retail stores as a percentage of disposable income. It is clear that
almost every type of durable commodity participated in both buy-
ing waves. The nondurables most affected were those sold by gen-
eral merchandise stores, grocery stores, and gasoline service stations.
Manufacturers and distributors were also influenced by expec-
tations of shortages, at least in the sense that their own buying prac-
tices paralleled those of consumers (Chart 7).It could be argued
that businessmen were merely acting to adjust stocks to changes in
the level of sales 6_it cannot be known whether they would have
accumulated inventories in the absence of forward buying by con-
sumers—but it is virtually certain that they actively shared the ex-
pectations of consumers. They were exposed to the same general
influences as consumers—the memories of wartime shortages, the
provisions for direct controls in the Defense Production Act of
1950, which was debated in July and August and enacted in Sep-
tember, and the progress of the military campaign in Korea—and
in addition they possessed the concrete evidence afforded by the
behavior of their own sales and stocks. In any event, whether busi-
6Thebehavior of stocks and sales during this period is consistent with the hypothesis
that distributors and manufacturers of consumer goods were attempting to maintain
stocks at some approximately normal ratio to sales but experienced difficulty in so
doing because of lags of deliveries behind orders and unforeseen fluctuations of sales.
Thus the initial buying wave sharply reduced stock-sales ratios on all market levels
(Chart 9) despite the fact that wholesale sales and new orders of manufacturers rose
along with retail sales (Chart 7). The stock-sales ratios then rose during the subse-
quent buying lull, even though wholesale sales and new orders of manufacturers
declined in sympathy with retail sales. This could be interpreted as an unintended
increase in stocks, at least during the last month or two, although comparison with
the turnover ratios of 1949 and 1952 suggests that stocks were not seriously out of line
with sales even in November. The same sequence was repeated during the winter, as
another reduction in stock-sales ratios occurred during the second buying wave and
was in turn succeeded by a sharp and no doubt unintended increase at the wholesale
and retail levels as retail sales declined once more, again despite the fact that whole-
sale sales and manufacturers' new orders duplicated the pattern of retail sales. This is
not to argue that businessmen were not speculating in inventory at the same time and
for the same reasons as consumers but only that either interpretation is consistent
with the observed movements of sales, stocks, and orders. It will be noted, however,
that the nonspeculation hypothesis implies that distributors automatically projected
the current level or rate of change of sales into the future without analyzing the
causes underlying the variations in sales, at least during the second buying wave after
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TABLE 1
SALES OF RETAIL STORES AS A PERCENTAGE OF DISPOSABLE
PERSONAL INCOME, 1950—1951nessmen merely reacted passively to the actions of consumers or
actively shared the expectations of consumers, the end result was
the same: a sharp increase in demand on all market levels during
the buying waves and inventory accumulation by businessmen as
well as consumers.
Thus forward buying shaped the character of the inflationary
phase of the Korean expansion. Two associated expectations
doubtless influenced consumers and businessmen: the fear that
shortages would develop as a consequence of formal or informal
rationing and the belief that prices would increase. Such expecta-
tions may develop from time to time in the market for a particular
product as a result of special conditions which affect that market
alone. When many groups hold such expectations at the same
time, affecting many markets, the short-period potential for infla-
tion is great. That was the situation in the last half of 1950. The
volume of demand generated by the forward buying was itself suf-
ficient to create temporary shortages at existing prices, and as a
result prices advanced rapidly. As it turned out, serious shortages
of consumer goods did not develop in 1951. However, this might
have happened if consumers and businessmen had not accumulated
stocks in 1950 and early 1951, since the government substantially
increased its claim on the nation's resources in 1951.
TheDeflationary Phase: 1951
Aremarkable transformation of the character of the expansion oc-
curred during 1951. The rise in gross national product had been
vigorous during the inflationary phase; in 1951 it was moderate.
Rising prices accompanied rising production up to the first quarter
of 1951; falling wholesale prices and stable industrial production
were the dominant trends through the remainder of the year. In-
creasing activity characterized most sectors of the economy untIl
the early months of 1951, after which activity diminished in many
sectors.
This last point deserves amplification. In general, industries re-
lated to defense experienced an expansion of activity, while other
industries experienced a contraction. These tendencies may be
21